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ABSTRACT
We use a micro-founded macroeconometric modeling framework to investigate the design of
monetary policy when the central bank faces uncertainty about the true structure of the economy. We
apply Bayesian methods to estimate the parameters of the baseline specification using postwar U.S.
data, and then determine the policy under commitment that maximizes household welfare. We find
that the performance of the optimal policy is closely matched by a simple operational rule that
focuses solely on stabilizing nominal wage inflation. Furthermore, this simple wage stabilization rule
is remarkably robust to uncertainty about the model parameters and to various assumptions regarding
the nature and incidence of the innovations. However, the characteristics of optimal policy are very
sensitive  to  the  specification  of  the  wage  contracting  mechanism,  thereby  highlighting  the
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noahw@princeton.eduUncertainty is not just an important feature of the monetary policy landscape;
it is the de¯ning characteristic of that landscape.
Alan Greenspan (2003)
1 Introduction
Eight years ago, two Macroeconomics Annual papers{Goodfriend and King (1997) and
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997){played a central role in stimulating a burgeoning research
program regarding the monetary policy implications of macroeconomic models with explicit
microeconomic foundations.1 This research program incorporates two crucial elements com-
pared with more traditional monetary policy analysis. First, re°ecting the in°uence of the
Lucas (1976) critique, the emphasis on explicit microeconomic foundations is intended to en-
sure that the resulting structural equations are reasonably invariant to the choice of monetary
policy. Second, this research follows the standard public ¯nance approach of determining
the policy regime that maximizes household welfare and then evaluating the performance of
alternative policies relative to this benchmark.
After initially focusing on small stylized models, this line of research has subsequently
proceeded to analyze micro-founded macroeconometric models that incorporate an expanded
set of nominal and real rigidities and hence can be matched more closely to observed ag-
gregate data. For example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) (henceforth CEE)
speci¯ed a dynamic general equilibrium model with a number of distinct structural features:
staggered wage and price setting with partial indexation; habit persistence in consumption;
endogenous capital accumulation with higher-order adjustment costs; and variable capac-
ity utilization.2 Smets and Wouters (2003a) (henceforth SW) later applied full-information
1Other early examples include Levin (1989), King and Wolman (1999), McCallum and Nelson (1999), and
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). For a thorough presentation of this approach as well as a comprehensive
bibliography, see Woodford (2003).
2Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) also documented the importance of these structural features
in generating a model-implied response to a monetary policy shock consistent with that of an identi¯ed
vector autoregression (VAR). More recently, Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2004) have extended
1Bayesian methods to estimate essentially the same speci¯cation (augmented by a larger set
of structural disturbances), and found that the model is competitive with an unrestricted
Bayesian VAR in terms of goodness-of-¯t and out-of-sample forecasting performance.3
In this paper, we investigate the design of monetary policy when the central bank faces
uncertainty regarding the true structure of the economy. Of course, a long-established litera-
ture has considered this topic using traditional structural macroeconomic models, building on
the seminal work of Brainard (1967).4 Nevertheless, recent analysis of small stylized micro-
founded models has demonstrated that the implications of uncertainty can be markedly
di®erent when the policymaker's goal is to maximize household welfare, because the welfare
function itself depends on the speci¯cation and parameter values of the model.5
By using a micro-founded macroeconometric modeling framework, we can examine the
policy implications of several aspects of uncertainty that may be more di±cult to consider
in a small stylized model. First, by applying Bayesian methods, we can use the posterior
distribution of the model parameters to determine whether simple rules that perform well in
the baseline economy are robust to parameter uncertainty, that is, to the range of parameter
values that are reasonably consistent with the observed data. Second, we can gauge the
degree of innovation uncertainty by evaluating the extent to which the policy conclusions
are sensitive to alternative assumptions regarding the nature and incidence of the structural
shocks to the model. Finally, we can explore the implications of speci¯cation uncertainty by
changing speci¯c features of the model such as the role of money balances or the structure
the model to incorporate ¯rm-speci¯c capital accumulation and have analyzed its behavior in response to
productivity shocks, while Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2004) incorporate a banking system and capital
market frictions in their study of the Great Depression.
3See also Smets and Wouters (2003b) as well as the papers cited in Section 3 below.
4See McCallum (1988), Craine (1979), Soderstrom (2002), Rudebusch (2001), Taylor (1999a), and Brock,
Durlauf, and West (2003). Robust control methods have also been used in investigating monetary policy
under uncertainty; see Hansen and Sargent (2003), Onatski and Stock (2002), Onatski (2000), Giannoni
(2002), and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2002).
5See Levin and J. Williams (2004), Kimura and Kurozumi (2003), and Walsh (2005).
2of nominal contracts.6
As the baseline speci¯cation for our analysis, we use a micro-founded macroeconometric
model similar to those studied by CEE and SW. Applying a Bayesian procedure to estimate
this model with postwar U.S. data, we set the baseline values of the model parameters using
the mean of the posterior distribution. We employ Lagrangian methods to determine the
optimal policy under commitment in the baseline economy. Finally, we use second-order
perturbation to solve the model and compute the level of welfare under the optimal policy
as well as for alternative simple rules.7
We ¯nd that a simple interest rate rule that responds solely to nominal wage in°ation and
the lagged interest rate yields a welfare outcome that nearly matches that under the fully
optimal policy.8 Because this rule only involves observable variables and does not require
a measure of the output gap, the natural rate of interest, or forecasts of variables, the rule
can be implemented without assuming that the policymaker knows the correct speci¯cation
of the model or the true values of the model parameters.
The near-optimality of the simple wage stabilization rule is directly attributable to the
overriding importance of nominal wage inertia in determining the welfare costs of aggregate
°uctuations in the baseline economy. This inertia re°ects the relatively long duration of
nominal wage contracts as well as the nearly-uniform degree of indexation to lagged in°ation.
Furthermore, under our baseline speci¯cation of Calvo-style contracts with an exogenous
probability of reoptimization, many wage contracts remain in e®ect much longer than the
6We do not explicitly consider the policy implications of uncertainty about the current state of the
economy; for recent analysis of this issue, see Orphanides (2001), Croushore and Stark (2003), Svensson and
Woodford (2003), Aoki (2003), Orphanides and Williams (2002), and Orphanides and Williams (2005).
7The optimal policy regime and optimized simple rules have previously been studied in micro-founded
macroeconometric models by Onatski and N. Williams (2004), Levin and Lopez-Salido (2004), Laforte (2003),
and Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2004).
8While we focus on simple interest rate rules in this paper, an alternative approach is to specify a simpli¯ed
objective function for the central bank, as in the literature on °exible in°ation targeting; see Svensson and
Woodford (2004) and Giannoni and Woodford (2004). Although not reported here, our preliminary analysis
suggests that stabilizing a wage in°ation objective may also perform well in terms of welfare.
3one-year average duration. Thus, as emphasized by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000),
stabilizing aggregate wage in°ation helps alleviate the degree of cross-sectional dispersion in
real wages and thereby minimizes the associated ine±ciencies in employment of di®erentiated
labor services and in the allocation of leisure across households.
The simple wage stabilization rule is remarkably robust to parameter uncertainty and
innovation uncertainty and to some modi¯cations of the baseline model speci¯cation. For
example, this rule yields near-optimal performance throughout the empirically relevant range
of values of the model parameters, a ¯nding consistent with our earlier work regarding the
relatively minor importance of this type of uncertainty.9 The performance of the wage
stabilization rule is also relatively insensitive to various assumptions regarding the nature
and incidence of the innovations and to augmenting the model to incorporate monetary
frictions.
Nevertheless, the policy implications can be quite sensitive to alternative speci¯cations of
the wage contracting mechanism. In particular, the welfare costs of nominal wage variability
are much smaller when wages are determined by Taylor-style contracts with the same average
duration as in our baseline speci¯cation of Calvo-style contracts.10 Thus, the simple wage
stabilization rule is no longer nearly optimal, and better welfare outcomes are provided by
other simple rules that respond to price in°ation and real economic variables. Of course,
as Hall (this volume) emphasizes, neither Calvo-style nor Taylor-style contracts provide the
ideal microeconomic foundations for the determination of nominal wages and employment.
Thus, our results should be interpreted as highlighting the extent to which additional research
regarding the structure of labor markets is likely to have substantial bene¯ts for the design
of monetary stabilization policy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the
9See Levin, Wieland, and J. Williams (1999), Levin, Wieland, and John C. Williams (2003), Levin and
J. Williams (2003), and Onatski and N. Williams (2003).
10See Erceg and Levin (2005).
4baseline model speci¯cation. Section 3 brie°y describes the estimation procedure and the
posterior distribution of the model parameters. Section 4 characterizes the optimal policy in
the baseline economy and compares the performance of alternative simple rules. Sections 5
and 6 analyze the implications of parameter uncertainty and innovation uncertainty, respec-
tively. Section 7 considers several types of speci¯cation uncertainty. Section 8 concludes.
The appendices contain some additional derivations and results.
2 The Model
As in CEE and SW, our baseline model incorporates a number of mechanisms that can induce
intrinsic persistence in the propagation of shocks, including habit persistence in consumption,
costs of adjustment for investment and capacity utilization, and staggered nominal wage
and price contracts with partial indexation. The model also includes a number of exogenous
disturbances (assumed to be mutually uncorrelated) that account for the stochastic variation
in the observed data used in our estimation procedure.
2.1 Household Preferences
The economy has a continuum of in¯nitely lived households. The conditional welfare of a
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s=0 ¯t+s. Thus, the
steady-state subjective discount factor is given by the parameter 0 < ¯ < 1, while stochastic
variation in the rate of time preference is induced by the exogenous disturbance Zb
t; we
assume that the logarithm of this disturbance follows an AR(1) process.













where Ct(h) denotes the household's total consumption, Lt(h) denotes its labor hours, and
Mt(h) denotes its real cash balances.11 The preference parameters, ¾, Â, ·, and ¹0, are
strictly positive, while µ lies in the unit interval. The exogenous disturbance ZL
t induces
stochastic variation in household preferences for leisure relative to consumption, and Zm
t is
an exogenous shock to money demand; the logarithm of each shock is assumed to follow an
AR(1) process.
Habit persistence in consumption is an important but somewhat controversial feature of
this speci¯cation. In particular, for positive values of µ, the household's lagged consumption
e®ectively serves as a reference value in determining the period utility generated by current
consumption.12 Recent empirical analysis of aggregate data has obtained substantial evi-
dence of habit persistence; for example, CEE emphasize its role explaining the hump-shaped
behavior of aggregate consumption in response to a monetary policy shock. Nevertheless,
it should be noted that micro-level studies have occasionally obtained results that directly
con°ict with the macro evidence.13
Of course, the curvature parameters of the utility function also remain quite controver-
sial. Some studies have argue that ¾ is around unity, while others ¯nd much larger values.14
Furthermore, microeconometric studies have typically obtained estimates of Â that are sig-
ni¯cantly greater than unity, whereas some macroeconomists have argued that the aggregate
11We interpret Mt as broad money and assume that households invest the remainder of their assets At¡Mt
with a ¯nancial intermediary earning the nominal interest rate Rt.
12Some authors have considered an alternative speci¯cation, referred to as \external habit persistence," in
which the lagged value of aggregate consumption serves as the reference value for each individual household.
In the absence of o®setting taxes, this formulation poses an externality that distorts the steady state; thus,
given our emphasis on the stabilization role of monetary policy, in this paper we focus exclusively on the
\internal habit" speci¯cation given in the text.
13For example, see the contrast between the conclusions of Fuhrer (2000) and Dynan (2000).
14See Guvenen (2005) for a recent survey of the literature and an attempt to reconcile the di®erences in
published estimates.
6data are consistent with a near-zero value of Â, corresponding to a very high intertemporal
elasticity of leisure for the representative household.15
Finally, while this speci¯cation allows real money balances to directly in°uence household
utility, most of our analysis will focus on the \cashless economy" emphasized by Woodford
(2003) and others; this economy corresponds to the limiting case in which ¹0 becomes arbi-
trarily small. Later in the paper, however, we will revisit this issue and examine the policy
implications of incorporating a non-trivial role for money into the model.
2.2 Production and Prices
The ¯nal composite good{used for both consumption and investment{is obtained by bundling
together a continuum of di®erentiated intermediate goods using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
function. As in SW, we allow the elasticity of substitution between di®erent goods to exhibit




t ¸p. The parameter ¸p > 0 determines the
steady-state markup rate, while the exogenous disturbance Z
p
t (assumed to have an i.i.d.
log-normal distribution) shifts the desired markup at each point in time. A given ¯rm,
indexed by i 2 [0;1], as the sole producer of intermediate good i, faces a downward-sloping




t is invariant to the ¯rm's level of
production.16
Interestingly, the steady-state markup parameter ¸p does not in°uence the ¯rst-order
dynamics of the model economy and hence cannot be estimated using the methods employed
in this paper. Nevertheless, this parameter does a®ect the second-order properties of the
model, including the welfare performance of monetary policy rules. In light of the available
15See Huang and Liu (2004) for a summary of recent evidence regarding the intertemporal elasticity of
labor supply at the intensive and extensive margins.
16Kimball (1995) proposed a more general form of aggregator function that allows for quasi-kinked demand
curves, and several recent empirical studies have analyzed its ¯rst-order implications; cf. Eichenbaum and
Fisher (2004), Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2004), and Coenen and Levin (2004). However,
higher-order approximations of the Kimball speci¯cation have not yet been considered and remain well
beyond the scope of the present analysis.
7evidence from disaggregated data, we set ¸p = 0:20 in the baseline version of the model, and
then consider alternative values from 0.1 to 0.5.17
Every intermediate-goods producer has an identical production function that determines
the gross output of good i as a Cobb-Douglas function of the ¯rm's employment of labor ser-
vices Nt(i), its rental of capital services ~ Kt(i), and the exogenous economy-wide productivity
factor At:
Yt(i) = At ~ Kt(i)
®Nt(i)
1¡® ¡ ©; (3)
where the parameter ® represents the share of capital in gross output, and we assume that
the logarithm of the productivity factor follows an AR(1) process. As in CEE and SW, every
¯rm hires its capital and labor services on competitive economy-wide markets and hence has
the same marginal cost of production.
The ¯rm's net output Yt(i) re°ects the presence of the ¯xed overhead cost ©. This
¯xed cost induces locally increasing returns to scale for each individual ¯rm, and generates
procyclical total factor productivity at the aggregate level. Thus, inferences about the value
of © can be made using both micro-level and macro-level data.
In the baseline version of the model, we assume that prices are determined by Calvo-
style nominal contracts with partial indexation.18 In particular, every ¯rm faces a constant
probability 1 ¡ »p of reoptimizing its price contract in any given period, where »p 2 [0;1];
thus, price contracts have an average duration 1=(1 ¡ »p). Whenever the contract is not
reoptimized, the ¯rm's price is automatically adjusted by the lagged rate of in°ation raised
to the power °p 2 [0;1].
This speci¯cation of price-setting behavior provides formal underpinnings for the hybrid
New Keynesian Phillips curve.19 In particular, the indexation parameter °p determines the
17For empirical analysis of demand elasticities and markups, see Shapiro (1987), Basu (1996), and Basu
and Fernald (1997).
18See Yun (1996) and Woodford (2003) for analysis of the microeconomic underpinnings of the contract
structure introduced by Calvo (1983).
19See Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003).
8relative weight on the \backward-looking" vs. \forward-looking" terms in the hybrid Phillips
curve. While the magnitude of these weights is subject to ongoing controversy, recent analysis
of aggregate data seems to be largely consistent with the available microeconomic evidence
indicating that indexation is not a typical characteristic of price adjustment.20
Under the assumption that all ¯rms have the same marginal cost, the responsiveness of
in°ation to current marginal cost is determined solely by the parameter »p. Typically, as
in SW, the estimated value of »p tends to imply a relatively long average duration of price
contracts that is inconsistent with recent microeconomic evidence.21 Several recent studies
have shown that incorporating additional real rigidities{such as quasi-kinked demand and
¯rm-speci¯c capital{yields more plausible estimates of the degree of nominal rigidity.22 Nev-
ertheless, analyzing the second-order implications of these mechanisms poses some technical
challenges that remain to be addressed in the literature.
2.3 Investment and Capacity Utilization
Households own the entire stock of physical capital Kt. Capital accumulation is subject to
adjustment costs that are assumed to be proportional to the squared growth rate of invest-
ment, rather than the more traditional formulation involving the squared level of investment.
As emphasized by CEE, this speci¯cation of adjustment costs can generate a hump-shaped
response of aggregate investment to a monetary policy shock, consistent with the implications
of an identi¯ed vector autoregression. While the formal microeconomic foundations of this
mechanism were initially opaque, Basu and Kimball (2003) have subsequently shown that
20For aggregate evidence on the degree of intrinsic in°ation persistence, see Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido
(2001) and Levin and Piger (2004). For a recent discussion of the microeconomic evidence, see Angeloni,
Aucremanne, Ehrmann, Gali, Levin, and Smets (2004).
21See Bils and Klenow (2004), Klenow and Kryvtsov (2004), and Dhyne, Alvarez, Bihan, Veronese, Dias,
Ho®mann, Jonker, Lnnemann, Rumler, and Vilmunen (2005).
22Sveen and Weinke (2004) and Woodford (2005) consider the analytical foundations of ¯rm-speci¯c cap-
ital, while empirical studies include Sbordone (2002), Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2001), Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2004), Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2004), and Coenen and Levin (2004).
9very similar implications can be obtained in a framework with planning delays in investment.
Thus, the capital stock owned by a given household h 2 [0;1] evolves as follows:














where Kt(h) denotes the household's beginning-of-period capital stock and It(h) denotes the
gross investment during period t. The depreciation rate is given by ±, and the parameter ³
gauges the magnitude of investment adjustment costs.23 Finally, the exogenous disturbance
ZI
t acts as an economy-wide shock to investment demand; its logarithm follows an AR(1)
process.
In each period, the aggregate °ow of capital services ~ Kt to the intermediate goods sector
is de¯ned as the capacity utilization rate Ut multiplied by the predetermined level of the
physical capital stock, Kt¡1. The capacity utilization rate can vary from its steady-state
value of unity, but such variations are associated with a real resource cost. In particular,




1 + Ã¡1 ; (5)
where Ã ¸ 0 and ¹ > 0.24
As emphasized by CEE, variable capacity utilization can e®ectively enhance the short-
term °exibility of the economy in response to aggregate shocks. Nevertheless, the magnitude
of the utilization cost parameter Ã is currently subject to a great deal of uncertainty, due
both to the scarcity of microeconomic evidence and to con°icting results from recent macroe-
conometric analysis. For example, CEE ¯nd that variations in capacity utilization play an
23This adjustment cost speci¯cation incorporates the basic properties assumed by CEE and SW, who were
only concerned with characterizing the steady state and log-linear properties of the model. By using an
explicit de¯nition of the adjustment cost function, we are able to analyze the second-order approximation of
the model economy.
24As with investment adjustment costs, this explicit speci¯cation incorporates the basic properties assumed
by CEE and SW, while enabling us to analyze the second-order approximation of the model economy.
10important role in explaining the sluggish response of in°ation to a monetary policy shock,
whereas the results of Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2004) suggest that the
aggregate e®ects of a technology shock are only consistent with relatively limited variations
in capacity utilization.
Finally, following SW, we include an \external ¯nance premium" shock Z
q
t (assumed
to have an i.i.d. log-normal distribution) which acts as a wedge between the risk-free real
interest rate and the required expected rate of return on physical capital. Recent analysis
of ¯rm-level data has obtained precise estimates of the magnitude and cyclical behavior
of the external ¯nance premium; cf. Levin, Natalucci, and Zakrajsek (2004). However,
further theoretical and empirical research is clearly needed to elucidate the underpinnings
and implications of this mechanism.
2.4 Employment and Wages
Households provide a continuum of di®erentiated labor services, which are bundled together
using a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator function and then rented to the intermediate sector. As in
SW, we allow the elasticity of substitution between di®erent types of labor services to ex-
hibit exogenous temporal variation; that is, ¸w
t = Zw
t ¸w. The parameter ¸w > 0 determines
the steady-state markup of real wages over the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and leisure. The exogenous disturbance Zw
t (assumed to have an i.i.d. log-normal
distribution) shifts the desired wage markup at each point in time. Given this speci¯cation,
a given household h 2 [0;1], as the sole provider of the labor service of type h, faces a
downward-sloping labor demand curve with elasticity ¡(1 + ¸w
t )=¸w
t .
In the baseline version of the model, we assume that wages are determined by Calvo-style
nominal contracts with partial indexation. In particular, each household faces a constant
probability 1 ¡ »w of reoptimizing its wage contract in any given period, where »w 2 [0;1].
Whenever the contract is not reoptimized, the household's wage is automatically adjusted
11by the lagged rate of price in°ation raised to the power °w 2 [0;1].
The steady-state markup parameter ¸w and the contract wage parameter »w cannot be
independently identi¯ed from the log-linear dynamics of the model. Given the scarcity of
disaggregated evidence on these two parameters, we proceed by calibrating ¸w = 0:20 (the
same baseline value as for ¸p) and estimating the value of »w.25 We will then gauge the policy
and welfare implications of alternative combinations of these two parameters that yield the
same ¯rst-order behavior of the model.
Because the wage-setting mechanism has crucial implications for the design of optimal
monetary policy, we will also consider two modi¯cations to the baseline speci¯cation, namely,
indexation of wages to lagged wage in°ation instead of lagged price in°ation and the use of
¯xed-duration \Taylor-style" wage contracts instead of Calvo-style contracts. As we will see,
these alternative speci¯cations yield signi¯cantly di®erent implications for monetary policy
and welfare.
2.5 Fiscal and Monetary Policy
We assume that government spending is exogenously determined and exhibits persistent
variations; in particular, its logarithm follows an AR(1) process. As is evident from the
previous discussion, government spending has no direct e®ects on either utility (through
purchases of public goods) or production (perhaps via a stock of public capital); consideration
of these channels, as well as automatic ¯scal stabilizers, is deferred to future research.
Furthermore, we assume that the government o®sets the steady-state e®ects of monop-
olistic distortions by enacting the appropriate magnitude of production and employment
subsidies, which are ¯nanced via a constant level of lump-sum taxes. Thus, the determin-
istic steady state is Pareto-optimal in the baseline model with a zero in°ation rate. Under
25Taylor (1999b) provides an overview of the evidence on nominal wage inertia. For analysis of the elasticity
of demand for di®erentiated labor services, see Gri±n (1996a), Gri±n (1996b).
12these assumptions, we can focus our analysis on the stabilization task of monetary policy,
abstracting from the complications that would arise if the central bank also played a role in
trying to o®set the e®ects of steady-state distortions.26
In estimating the model, we use a fairly simple monetary policy rule in which the short-
term nominal interest rate responds to the lagged interest rate as well as to deviations of
aggregate price in°ation from target and of actual output from the level that would prevail
in the absence of nominal inertia. This speci¯cation includes two additional exogenous
shocks, namely, persistent AR(1) shifts in the in°ation objective and transitory white-noise
shocks to the current policy rate. In our normative analysis, of course, we consider the full
Ramsey policy as well as alternative speci¯cations of simple policy rules, and we assume that
monetary policy does not exhibit any exogenous stochastic variation.
3 Model Estimation
We employ Bayesian methods to estimate the log-linearized version of the model, using
quarterly U.S. data over the period 1955:1 through 2001:4.27 In particular, we treat seven
aggregate variables as directly observed: real consumption, real investment, real GDP, real
wages, total hours, GDP price in°ation, and the federal funds rate.28 Because the rest of the
model variables (such as the capital stock) are treated as unobserved, we use the Kalman
¯lter in computing the likelihood function of the model.
As widely recognized in earlier work, certain structural parameters are not well-identi¯ed
from the cyclical dynamics of the data. Therefore, we use long-term historical averages to
26For analysis of optimal policy in economies with steady-state distortions, see Benigno and Woodford
(2004) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (this volume).
27A detailed description of the log-linearized model is provided in Appendix B.
28We use the same dataset as in Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2004), obtained from Martin
Eichenbaum's web page. The real wage is constructed as non-farm wage rate adjusted by the GDP price
de°ator, while total hours are measured for the non-farm business sector. The in°ation rate and interest
rate are demeaned and converted to quarterly rates; the other ¯ve variables are measured in logarithmic
deviations from linear trends, in percentage points.
13specify the values of these parameters: the capital share parameter ® = 0:36; the discount
factor ¯ = 0:99 (corresponding to a steady-state real interest rate of about 4 percent); and
the depreciation parameter ± = 0:025 (corresponding to an annual rate of about 10 percent).
Similarly, we calibrate the output shares of consumption, investment, and government spend-
ing at cy = ¹ C=¹ Y = 0:56, iy = 0:24, and gy = 0:20, respectively.29 Finally, we set the wage
and price markup parameters ¸w = ¸p = 0:2; in the following section, we will consider the
implications of alternative values for these two parameters.
We formulate independent prior densities for each of the other 31 parameters of the model,
namely, ten parameters related to preferences and technology, ¯ve coe±cients of the empirical
interest rate reaction function, and sixteen parameters of the data-generating processes for
the disturbances. Overall, our prior is consistent with the previous literature and is relatively
uninformative for most of the parameters; details are given in the appendix.30 Given these
priors, we characterize the posterior distribution using a Metropolis-Hastings Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. Our estimation methodology is broadly similar to that of
Lubik and Schorfheide (2005); further details are provided in the appendix.31
In the remainder of this section, we focus on characterizing the posterior distribution of
the key structural parameters. Table 1 reports the posterior means and the 5% and 95%
bounds for each of these parameters, while corresponding results for the parameters of the
shock processes may be found in the appendix.
As depicted in Figure 1, the macroeconomic data are quite informative regarding the
parameters related to price and wage determination. In light of recent micro-based evidence
29The mean ratio of net exports to GDP was zero to two decimal points over our sample.
30In specifying these priors, we have drawn heavily on Smets and Wouters (2003a), (Smets and Wouters
2003b), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2004), and
Onatski and N. Williams (2004).
31Since the work of Schorfheide (2000) and especially after the original Smets and Wouters (2003a) paper
there have been a number of papers using Bayesian methods for models similar to ours; examples include Del
Negro and Schorfheide (2004), Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2003), Laforte (2003), Onatski and N. Williams
(2004), and del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2004).
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Figure 1: Estimated posterior distributions (red solid lines) and prior distributions (blue dashed) for the
price and wage parameters.
15Table 1: Estimation Results
Posterior 90% Probability
Parameter Mean Interval
»p Calvo prices 0.83 0.81 { 0.86
»w Calvo wages 0.79 0.72 { 0.85
°p Price indexation 0.08 0.00 { 0.21
°w Wage indexation 0.79 0.43 { 1.00
³ Investment adjustment 0.56 0.27 { 0.86
¾ Consumption utility 2.19 1.68 { 2.74
µ Consumption habit 0.29 0.20 { 0.38
Â Labor utility 1.49 0.95 { 2.12
Á Fixed cost 1.09 1.06 { 1.11
Ã Capital utilization 0.21 0.12 { 0.31
obtained by Bils and Klenow (2004) and Golosov and Lucas (2003), we specify a prior mean of
0.38 for the Calvo price-setting parameter »p, corresponding to an average contract duration
of about 1.5 quarters; we employed the same prior mean for the Calvo wage parameter »w. In
contrast, the posterior mean estimates for these two parameters imply an average contract
duration of about ¯ve quarters, similar to the ¯ndings of CEE and SW.32 Furthermore, the
posterior probability intervals of these estimates are relatively narrow, suggesting a fairly
clear disconnect between the micro and macro evidence.
We impose relatively uninformative priors on the degree of price and wage indexation.
The estimate of the degree of price indexation is near zero and relatively precisely estimated;
in contrast, the degree of wage indexation is found to be substantial, but very imprecisely
estimated. The lack of price indexation di®ers from SW but is consistent with the ¯ndings
of Ireland (2001) and Edge, Laubach, and J. Williams (2003).
The macroeconomic data are somewhat less informative regarding other structural pa-
rameters. Figure 2 repeats the previous ¯gure for the structural parameters not related to
price and wage determination. Overall, the resulting estimates are consistent with estimates
32For comparison, Taylor (1993b), using a staggered wage model, estimates an average wage contract
duration of about 3-1/2 quarters.
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Figure 2: Estimated posterior distributions (red solid lines) and prior distributions (blue dashed) for
structural parameters.
17from the literature. Except for the parameters determining capacity utilization costs and
habit persistence, the posteriors do not di®er greatly from the respective priors. The ¯nding
of a relatively tight posterior distribution for the capacity utilization cost parameter occurs
despite the imposition of a relatively loose prior and contrasts with the wide dispersion of
estimates of this parameter in the literature.
One structural parameter that deserves further discussion is the returns to scale in pro-
duction, Á. We chose a relatively tight prior centered on 1.08 for this parameter, based on
the estimates of Basu (1996) and Basu and Fernald (1997), who ¯nd ¯xed costs of between
3 and 10 percent. Our resulting mean estimate is 1.09. By comparison, when we imposed
an uninformative prior, the mode estimate exceeded 2, a result consistent with the ¯ndings
of SW, but contrary to the micro evidence. Despite this di®erence in point estimates, in fact
the data were not terribly informative about this parameter, as seen in the ¯gure. Interest-
ingly, imposing our prior on Á resulted in a small estimate of investment adjustment costs.
Our estimate of investment adjustment costs are noticeably lower than SW, but more in line
with those reported by ACEL.
For the monetary policy reaction function, we obtain the following estimation results:
rt = 0:84
(0:03)













where the estimated standard error of each coe±cient is enclosed in parentheses. This
reaction function exhibits a high degree of inertia, a strong long-run response to in°ation,
modest sensitivity to the level of the output gap, and a sizeable response to changes in the
output gap.
As for the monetary policy shocks, we ¯nd that the in°ation target ¼¤
t has signi¯cant
variation and exhibits very high persistence approaching that of a random walk, while the
transitory disturbance ´r
t has negligible variance. It should be noted that our modeling
framework does not provide any rationale or potential bene¯ts from a time-varying in°ation
18target or from idiosyncratic disturbances to the policy rule. Thus, given our focus on policies
that maximize social welfare, henceforth we eliminate these two shocks by setting their
variances to zero.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy
In this section, we characterize the monetary policy implications of the baseline model at the
posterior mean values of the estimated parameters, abstracting from uncertainty about the
true structure of the economy. We start by considering the optimal policy under commitment
that maximizes conditional expected welfare, and then compare the performance of simple
rules in which the short-term interest rate is adjusted in response to one or more observable
variables.
4.1 The Optimal Policy Problem
The optimal policy under commitment can be computed by formulating an in¯nite-horizon
Lagrangian problem, in which the central bank maximizes conditional expected social wel-
fare subject to the full set of non-linear constraints implied by the private sector's behavioral
equations and the market-clearing conditions of the model economy.33 The ¯rst-order con-
ditions of this problem are obtained by di®erentiating the Lagrangian with respect to each
of the endogenous variables (including the policy instrument) and setting these derivatives
to zero. Of course, performing these derivations by hand would be extremely tedious; thus,
we utilize the symbolic Matlab procedures developed by Levin and Lopez-Salido (2004).34
We then proceed to analyze the behavior of the economy under optimal policy by com-
bining the central bank's ¯rst-order conditions together with the private sector's behavioral
equations and the market-clearing conditions. Thus, the size of the model is much larger
33See Kydland and Prescott (1980), King and Wolman (1999), and Khan, King, and Wolman (2003).
34These procedures are available on the Dynare website or on request from the authors.
19under the optimal policy, because these ¯rst-order conditions take the place of a single inter-
est rate reaction function, while the set of Lagrange multipliers is added to the list of model
variables. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that no new parameters have been added
to the model, because the central bank's ¯rst-order conditions involve the same structural
parameters as in the behavioral equations and market-clearing conditions.
Because this set of non-linear equations involves rational expectations, numerical meth-
ods are required to characterize the equilibrium properties of the stochastic economy.35 Fur-
thermore, while the ¯rst-order dynamics can be investigated by log-linearizing the model,
higher-order methods are needed to evaluate conditional expected welfare.36 Therefore, we
employ the DYNARE software package of Juillard (2001) to compute the second-order ap-
proximation of the model economy.37
Finally, as in Levin and Lopez-Salido (2004), our analysis is focused on evaluating the
welfare cost of business cycles; that is, for each monetary policy regime, we measure how
conditional expected welfare changes in response to the stochastic variation of the model
economy.38 Throughout the paper, welfare costs are expressed in terms of the equivalent
percent decline in steady-state consumption.
4.2 Characteristics of Optimal Policy
The deterministic steady state of the baseline economy is characterized by a zero in°ation
rate. In particular, as noted above, we assume that ¯scal subsidies o®set the steady-state
monopolistic distortions to production and employment, while money is essentially absent
from the baseline speci¯cation. Thus, in the absence of stochastic shocks, the central bank's
35Judd (1998) provides a general introduction and comparison of methods for solving non-linear rational
expectations models.
36See Kim and Kim (2003), Kim, Kim, Schaumburg, and Sims (2003), and Woodford (2003).
37Because perturbation methods provide a local approximation around the steady state, our analysis does
not consider the implications of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.
38For this purpose, it is essential to utilize conditional mean-preserving spreads for the exogenous distur-
bances; see Levin and Lopez-Salido (2004) for further discussion.
20sole task is to choose the constant in°ation rate that minimizes the degree of cross-sectional
dispersion in prices and wages; indeed, by maintaining a zero in°ation rate, monetary policy
succeeds in implementing the Pareto-optimal equilibrium in steady state.
The ¯rst-order implications of the optimal policy are shown in Figure 3, which depicts
the response of selected macro variables to an exogenous rise in the productivity factor.39
The optimal policy (solid line) yields a path of short-term real interest rates that closely
resembles that of the \real business cycle" (RBC) economy with °exible wages and prices
(dot-dashed line); in contrast, real interest rates are nearly constant under the empirical
reaction function (dashed line). In the RBC economy, real wages initially rise about 3/4
percent; with a constant price level, this adjustment occurs solely through a surge in nominal
wage in°ation. In contrast, the optimal policy for the baseline economy is mainly oriented
towards minimizing cross-sectional dispersion in wage rates, and hence permits a noticeable
decline in prices while nominal wage in°ation remains close to zero.
Under the optimal policy (as in the RBC economy), the positive shock to productivity
induces a substantial decline in aggregate labor hours that is gradually reversed over the
subsequent year. Under the empirical reaction function, labor hours only decline for a single
quarter and then rise above baseline. These ¯ndings relate to the debate regarding the
empirical evidence of the response of hours to productivity shocks and the sensitivity of
these results to monetary policy.
We now compare the welfare implications of these policies for the baseline economy
with stochastic variation in all of the exogenous disturbances except the monetary policy
shocks. For each policy, Table 2 reports the welfare cost of business cycles in terms of the
equivalent percentage point change in steady-state consumption; this table also indicates
welfare outcomes for two simple rules that are discussed further below.
Under the empirical reaction function, the welfare cost of business cycles in the baseline
39Impulse responses for other structural shocks are reported in the Appendix.














































Figure 3: Impulse responses for one standard deviation positive shock to productivity; optimal policy (solid
lines), empirical reaction function (dashed), RBC economy (dash-dotted lines).
22Table 2: The Welfare Cost of Business Cycles
Empirical reaction function -2.57
Optimized price in°ation rule -2.60
Optimized wage in°ation rule -2.13
Optimal policy -2.01
model is equivalent to a permanent 2.6 percent reduction in household consumption. The
optimal policy is associated with a markedly lower cost of business cycles, equivalent to
about 2 percent of steady-state consumption. It should be noted that these welfare costs
are an order of magnitude larger than in the results emphasized by Lucas (2003), mainly
because staggered contracts induce substantial cross-sectional dispersion in relative prices
and wages.40
To gauge these welfare results more concretely, we note that U.S. personal consumption
expenditures were about $28,000 per person in 2004; thus, switching from the empirical
reaction function to the optimal policy would permanently raise welfare by about $160 per
person, while eliminating all stochastic variation in the economy would generate a permanent
welfare gain exceeding $700 per person. As we will see below, however, the magnitude of
the welfare costs can be quite sensitive to the parameter values of the model as well as to
the speci¯cation of the innovations and the determination of wages and prices.
4.3 Simple Policy Rules
We now consider the performance of simple policy rules with coe±cients chosen to maximize
welfare in the baseline model.41 In particular, we examine rules with the following form:
rt = rirt¡1 + r¼¼t + r!!t; (6)
40For related analysis and results, see Cho, Cooley, and Phaneuf (1997), Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba
(2004), and Paustian (2004).
41For analysis and discussion of the rationale for simple rules, see Taylor (1993a) and Williams (2003).
23where the nominal interest rate rt responds to the price in°ation rate ¼t and the nominal
wage in°ation rate !t as well as to the lagged nominal interest rate. This type of rule is
operational in the sense of McCallum (1999), in the sense that the policy instrument is
determined only by observable variables, and not by model-speci¯c constructed data such as
the natural rates of interest and output, and forecasts of variables (which require knowledge
of the economy).42 Furthermore, it is equivalent to targeting a deterministic path for the
level of wages or prices; such policies have been shown to perform very well in the presence
of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.43
Given the role of wage dispersion in determining the welfare cost of business cycles, it
is useful to consider policy rules that respond directly to nominal wage in°ation, as sug-
gested by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000).44 Therefore, we consider a hybrid rule that
responds di®erentially to both price and wage in°ation, as well as rules that respond to
price in°ation alone. Optimizing the coe±cients of the hybrid rule to maximize welfare in
the baseline model, we ¯nd that r! = 3:2 while r¼ = 0. Thus, given that the optimized
rule does not actually respond to price in°ation, we simply refer to this rule as the bench-
mark wage in°ation rule. We then compare its performance to an alternative rule that does
not respond to wages{henceforth referred to as the benchmark price in°ation rule{for which
welfare optimization yields r¼ = 2:1.
As indicated in Table 2, the benchmark wage in°ation rule yields a welfare outcome nearly
identical to the optimal policy; indeed, following this simple wage in°ation rule rather than
the optimal policy would incur a welfare cost equivalent to less than $35 per person per year.
In contrast, the benchmark price in°ation rule yields a welfare loss that is roughly the same
as under the empirical reaction function.
42McCallum (1999) also highlights the role of information lags; thus, while our speci¯cation utilizes con-
temporaneous data, it will be useful to consider this issue further in subsequent research.
43See Reifschneider and Williams (2000), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), and others.
44See also Erceg and Levin (2005) and Mankiw and Reiss (2002).











































Figure 4: Impulse responses for one standard deviation positive shock to productivity; optimal policy (solid
lines), optimized wage in°ation rule (dashed lines), and the optimized price in°ation rule (dash-dot lines).
25The impulse responses to the technology shock under the benchmark wage in°ation rule
mimics closely those of the optimal policy, as seen in Figure 4. One di®erence is that the
benchmark wage in°ation rule initially tightens monetary policy, causing a slightly excessive
fall in labor hours and consumption at the onset of the shock. After a few quarters, how-
ever, the benchmark wage in°ation rule gets back on track, and the paths of labor hours,
consumption, and price and wage in°ation are virtually identical to those obtained under
the optimal policy. In contrast, the benchmark price in°ation rule is overly stimulative at
the onset of the shock, keeping price in°ation near baseline but generating excessive nominal
wage in°ation.
5 Parameter Uncertainty
In this section, we explore the sensitivity of household welfare to variations in the parameters
under the wage in°ation policy rule optimized to the baseline parameters discussed in Section
3. We evaluate the performance of this rule in comparison with that of the optimal policy
determined using the true values of the model parameters.
5.1 Estimated Parameters
We start by considering the e®ect of uncertainty as measured by our estimated posterior
distribution. We compute the welfare losses associated with joint parameter uncertainty of
the ten structural parameters together.45 For this purpose, we randomly select 5000 draws
of the parameter vector from the posterior distribution described above. For each draw,
we compute welfare under the optimal policy for the true set of parameters and under the
benchmark wage in°ation policy. Note that this method incorporates the covariance between
the model parameters, allowing for the possibility that particular combinations of parameter
45We do not, however, vary the parameters associated with the shock processes or the calibrated parame-
ters.
















Figure 5: The distribution of welfare losses for the estimated posterior distribution. Top panel: Welfare
losses relative to the steady state for the optimal policy tuned to each parameter draw (red line) and the
benchmark wage in°ation rule (dashed blue line) Bottom panel: Di®erence in welfare loss between the
optimal and benchmark wage in°ation rule.
realizations may have sizeable e®ects on outcomes. Figure 5 reports the results from this
exercise; the upper panel shows the resulting distributions of welfare losses under the two
policies and the lower panel shows the distribution of the relative welfare loss equal to the
di®erence in welfare between the optimal policy and the benchmark wage in°ation rule.
Uncertainty about the structural parameters implies a great deal of uncertainty regarding
the welfare loss associated with °uctuations, but far less uncertainty regarding the perfor-
mance of the benchmark wage in°ation rule relative to the optimal policy. As seen in the
upper panel of the ¯gure, the distribution of welfare losses under either policy is wide with
27a relatively long left tail. Under the optimal policy, the median welfare loss is 2.1 percent,
just 0.1 percentage point larger than for the posterior mean estimates, but the 90 percent
con¯dence interval for the welfare loss ranges from 4.3 percent to 0.9 percent. The results
under the benchmark wage in°ation rule are comparable. Thus, parameter uncertainty can
easily make the welfare costs of °uctuations more than double what we estimate, or, for
that matter, half as large. However, as the lower panel of the ¯gure shows, the performance
of the benchmark wage in°ation rule relative to the optimal policy is remarkably robust to
parameter uncertainty. Indeed, the mean relative welfare loss, evaluated over the posterior
distribution, is 0.14 percent, compared to 0.12 percent assuming no uncertainty, and the 90
percent probability interval for the relative welfare loss is fairly narrow, ranging from 0.06
to 0.35 percent.
Because the benchmark rule performs so well across the posterior distribution, it is not
surprising that taking account of parameter uncertainty as measured by the posterior distri-
bution has virtually no e®ect on the parameters or expected performance of the optimized
wage in°ation rule. We computed the coe±cient of a wage in°ation rule that maximizes ex-
pected welfare integrating over the posterior distribution as above. The optimal coe±cient
equals 2.9, slightly lower than the value of 3.2 in the case of no uncertainty. But, this rule
yields an increase in expected welfare relative to the benchmark wage in°ation rule of only
0.0004 percent. Thus, the existence of parameter uncertainty, as measured by the posterior
distribution, is nearly irrelevant for designing policy in this model. Of course, a signi¯cant
reduction in this uncertainty could have implications for the design of policy and welfare, as
we examine next.
The degree of parameter uncertainty represented by the posterior distribution likely un-
derstates the true degree of uncertainty that policymakers face. As discussed in Onatski and
N. Williams (2003) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2005), the mean and spread of the posterior
distributions are highly sensitive to the assumed prior distributions. Point estimates and
28their standard errors are sensitive to estimation methodology, sample, and the values of cal-
ibrated parameters.46 This sensitivity is illustrated by the wide range of point estimates for
various model parameters found in what are nearly identical models studied in CEE, SW,
and this paper.
Given this concern that the degree of parameter uncertainty may exceed that implied by
the posterior distribution, we now examine the robustness of the benchmark wage in°ation
rule to a much wider set of parameter values. A second goal of this analysis is to uncover
which parameters entail costly consequences when an estimate is far from the true value. To
facilitate our analysis, we vary speci¯c parameters one at a time, holding all other param-
eters at their respective mean estimates. We focus our analysis on the di®erence in welfare
between that found under the benchmark wage in°ation rule and the optimal policy for the
speci¯ed parameter. Again, we measure the potential loss in switching from the optimal
policy (assuming the true parameter value is known) to the benchmark wage in°ation rule
(optimized for the baseline parameters).
We start with the parameters describing price and wage determination. Figure 6 plots
the di®erences in the consumption-equivalent welfare losses between the optimal policy and
the benchmark wage in°ation rule as the four parameters related to price- and wage-setting
are varied. The results for the Calvo parameters are shown in the upper panels; the results
for the indexation parameters are shown in the lower panels. The vertical lines indicate the
5% and 95% posterior bounds for the parameters calculated from the MCMC simulations.
If the resulting plotted line is horizontal, estimation error for that parameter has no welfare
costs, while a steeply sloped line indicates that parameter estimation error carries high costs
and that better estimates could have a large social bene¯t.
Although uncertainty regarding the wage and price parameters based on the estimated
46In addition, the welfare costs of °uctuations are very sensitive to the assumed degree of substitutability





































Figure 6: Parameter uncertainty: price and wage setting. The di®erence in welfare between the benchmark
wage in°ation rule and the optimal policy. The two vertical lines indicate the 5 and 95 percent bounds from
the posterior distributions.
30probability intervals has very modest implications for the performance of the benchmark
wage in°ation rule, looked at from a broader, or an explicitly min-max, perspective, reducing
uncertainty about price- and wage-setting parameters could yield moderate bene¯ts in terms
of monetary policy design and welfare. The relative performance of the benchmark wage
in°ation rule is sensitive to very high values of the Calvo wage parameter. For the other
Calvo price and indexation parameters, the performance of the benchmark wage in°ation
policy drops o® if prices are reoptimized very frequently or if a high share of contracts is
indexed, neither of which is likely according to the posterior distribution. For example,
consider the case that the true Calvo price parameter, »p, is as low as some of the micro
evidence suggests. According to the posterior distribution, such a low value is extremely
unlikely. But, if true, knowledge of this parameter could be used to design a monetary
policy that yields a moderate improvement in welfare. The same applies for the Calvo wage
and price indexation parameters. Although the degree of wage indexation is imprecisely
estimated, the relative welfare loss is nearly invariant to the value of this parameter.
Figure 7 plots the results for the parameters related to preferences and technology. Given
the estimated precision of these parameter estimates, parameter uncertainty has trivial im-
plications for welfare and therefore for policy. For example, although Â, the parameter
measuring the disutility of labor, is imprecisely estimated, it has only a modest e®ect on
relative welfare.
It should be noted that the parameter Á, which measures the degree of increasing returns,
does have a signi¯cant e®ect on relative welfare under the benchmark wage rule. With a
loose prior, we would estimate a value for this parameter near 2. Assuming that the results of
the literature indicating at most modest increasing returns are true, the resulting reduction
in uncertainty has a large e®ect on welfare in this model assuming policy is designed to be
optimal at the baseline estimates. Moreover our estimate of the habit persistence parameter
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Figure 7: Parameter uncertainty: other structural parameters. The di®erence in welfare between the
benchmark wage in°ation rule and the optimal policy. The two vertical lines indicate the 5 and 95 percent
bounds from the posterior distributions.
32again, we ¯nd such values to be unlikely but we ¯nd a signi¯cant drop in the performance
of the benchmark wage in°ation rule when the habit parameter increases past 0.5. Finally,
knowledge of the true magnitude of investment adjustment costs would be valuable for policy
design.
5.2 Steady-state Markups
As noted above, we cannot estimate the steady-state price and wage markups using the
¯rst-order dynamics of the model, but instead calibrate both to be 20 percent. Given the
uncertainty regarding the values of these parameters, we brie°y explore the implications of
alternative calibrations of the steady-state markups for monetary policy.
The magnitude of welfare losses depends on the steady-state price markup, but the
performance of the benchmark wage in°ation rule relative to the optimal policy is insensitive
to this parameter. We evaluate the welfare losses under four representative monetary policies
analyzed above as ¸p is varied from 0.1 to 0.5, holding all other parameters ¯xed. Recall
that the steady-state price markup does not a®ect the ¯rst-order properties of the system.47
The results are shown in the upper part of Table 3. Welfare losses are larger, the smaller
is the steady-state price markup, re°ecting the e®ect of greater dispersion when goods are
more highly substitutable. The relative performance of the various policies is insensitive to
the value of the steady-state price markup.
The welfare losses are highly sensitive to the value of the steady-state wage markup, and
for very high values of this parameter, the performance of the benchmark price in°ation
policy rule approaches that of the benchmark wage in°ation rule. In considering the e®ects
of variations in ¸w, we vary the value of Calvo wage parameter, »w, so that the ¯rst-order
properties of the model are constant.48 We hold all other parameter values ¯xed at baseline
47Note that we do not impose a relationship between the ¯xed cost parameter and the markup implied by
a zero-pro¯t condition.
48Thus, we isolate the e®ects of changing the substitutability of di®erent types of labor on welfare from
33Table 3: Welfare Losses and the Steady-State Markups
Optimal Empirical Benchmark Wage Benchmark Price
Experiment Policy Reaction In°ation Rule In°ation Rule
Price markup: ¸p
0.10 -2.13 -2.72 -2.23 -2.64
0.20 -2.01 -2.57 -2.13 -2.60
0.50 -1.92 -2.48 -2.07 -2.57
Wage markup: ¸w
0.05 -4.91 -7.94 -6.05 -7.90
0.10 -3.18 -4.43 -3.47 -4.44
0.20 -2.01 -2.57 -2.13 -2.60
0.50 -1.15 -1.42 -1.30 -1.45
values. Note that even with a high steady-state wage markup, the benchmark wage in°ation
policy rule performs well, although the di®erence between it and the rules that respond to
price in°ation is much smaller than in the baseline model.
6 Innovation Uncertainty
We now consider alternative assumptions regarding the set of shocks in the model. In
computing welfare, we have had to take a stand on each shock as to whether it re°ects shifts
in fundamentals, the e®ects of distortions, or measurement error. In particular, we have
assumed that the wage and price shocks and the shocks to the external ¯nance premium are
distortionary, while the remaining shocks re°ect shifts in fundamentals. We now revisit these
assumptions and evaluate the performance of the various monetary policies under alternative
assumptions regarding the nature of innovations.
The baseline model is admittedly pro°igate in specifying shocks. In particular, the ex-
ternal ¯nance premium has a large estimated variance and may be important for welfare
according to the model, but arguably lacks microfoundations. Importantly, we have assumed
those on the sensitivity of wages to movements in the marginal rate of substitution.
34Table 4: Welfare under Innovation Uncertainty
Optimal Empirical Benchmark Wage Benchmark Price
Experiment Policy Reaction In°ation Rule In°ation Rule
Baseline speci¯cation -2.01 -2.57 -2.13 -2.60
Eliminate shocks to:
External ¯nance premium -2.00 -2.55 -2.11 -2.57
Price markup -1.95 -2.51 -2.04 -2.48
Wage markup -0.22 -0.44 -0.30 -0.65
Time preference -2.29 -2.78 -2.38 -2.76
Labor disutility -2.24 -2.79 -2.36 -2.79
Assume shocks distortionary
Time preference -2.58 -3.35 -2.68 -3.08
Labor disutility -2.46 -3.14 -2.59 -3.01
that this shock does not a®ect fundamentals, but instead represents ine±cient °uctuations
in an external ¯nance premium or a type of \animal spirits" that monetary policy should
counteract. We therefore consider an alternative model speci¯cation in which these shocks
do not exist, that is, Tobin's Q strictly follows fundamentals. We assume that these shocks
represent measurement error evident in estimating the model, but that they have no e®ects
on the actual allocation of resources. We do no re-estimate the model, but rather simply set
the variance of the external ¯nance premium shocks to zero.49 The second line of Table 4
reports the results from this experiment. Interestingly, eliminating the external ¯nance pre-
mium shocks has little e®ect on welfare or on the relative performance of the various policy
rules.
We further examine how the policy rules perform under alternative assumptions regarding
the nature of shocks to price and wage markups. In the baseline model, these shocks are
49In a previous version of this paper, we estimated an alternative model that included no external ¯nance
premium shocks. Estimates of most model parameters were nearly identical to the baseline estimates.
Exceptions included the estimate of ³, which fell, implying signi¯cantly higher costs of adjusting investment,
and the investment adjustment cost shock became more variable and less persistent. The e®ects on welfare
of this speci¯cation were modest.
35viewed as being distortionary movements in markups. We now consider the possibility that
these disturbances simply re°ect measurement error. Again, we do not re-estimate the
model, but instead simply zero out these residuals. We consider each shock in isolation and
the combined e®ect. The results are shown in the upper part of Table 4.
Eliminating either markup shock reduces the welfare costs of °uctuations, but does not
alter the relative performance of the various policy rules. In either case, the welfare gap
between the optimal policy and the benchmark wage in°ation rule is reduced relative to that
in the baseline speci¯cation. The price shocks have relatively little e®ect on welfare; the
wage shocks, however, are an important source of welfare loss under both the optimal and
the benchmark policies but, nevertheless, have little e®ect on the relative performance of the
benchmark wage in°ation policy rule.
Finally, we consider the nature of disturbances to preferences. In the baseline model, we
have assumed that shocks to time preference and the disutility of labor re°ect fundamental
movements in the economy that monetary policy should accommodate. We consider two
alternative assumptions. First, we assume that the shocks merely re°ect measurement error
and evaluate the four policies under the assumption that the preference shock does not exist.
As before, we consider each shock in isolation. Interestingly, eliminating either preference
shock increases welfare under the various policies by about 0.25 percentage point; that
is, stochastic shocks to preferences are welfare-enhancing in our baseline model.50 The
performance of the benchmark wage in°ation rule relative to the optimal policy is virtually
unchanged. Second, we consider the assumption that the preference shocks re°ect non-
fundamentals, such as changes in tax rates. The results are shown in the lower section of
Table 4. In this case, the welfare losses are signi¯cantly higher than in the baseline model,
but, again, the performance of the benchmark wage in°ation rule relative to the optimal
50Because a shock to preferences a®ects only welfare and not the production possibilities of the economy,
with °exible wages and prices, welfare is non-decreasing to a mean-preserving spread to preferences.
36policy does not deteriorate.
Regardless of the assumption about the nature of these shocks, the benchmark wage
in°ation rule is nearly optimal and outperforms the estimated and benchmark price in°ation
rules by a signi¯cant margin. In summary, although innovation uncertainty exacerbates the
already signi¯cant uncertainty about the magnitude of the welfare costs of °uctuations, the
benchmark wage in°ation rule is remarkably robust to changes in assumptions regarding the
nature of shocks hitting the economy.
7 Speci¯cation Uncertainty
We now proceed to consider the broader problem of speci¯cation uncertainty in the sense
of Leamer (1978).51 In specifying the baseline model, we made numerous choices that a®ect
the parameter estimates, the structure of the model, and the determinants of welfare. In this
section, we analyze the sensitivity of optimal policies to alternate assumptions regarding the
model speci¯cation and evaluate the marginal bene¯t of reducing uncertainty of each of the
key speci¯cation issues in terms of social welfare. As in the preceding section, this analysis
provides information on the value, from the perspective of monetary policy, of improving
our knowledge of speci¯cation issues and suggests where the highest payo®s are for further
research in this area. While the list of speci¯cations we consider is far from exhaustive, it
provides some examples of the type of speci¯cation uncertainty that may be important for
policy analysis.
7.1 Monetary Frictions and Working Capital
Our baseline model can be viewed as a \cashless economy" that completely abstracts from
monetary frictions. We now investigate the policy implications of incorporating household
51For some early analysis of speci¯cation uncertainty in structural models, see Becker, Dwolatsky, Karak-
itsos, and Rustem (1986) and Frankel and Rockett (1988).
37demand for money as well as working-capital considerations for ¯rms. First, we permit
the scale parameter ¹0 to have a non-trivial value, so that real money balances have direct
e®ects on household utility. Second, following CEE, we assume that ¯rms must borrow from
¯nancial intermediaries to cover their wage bill and then repay the loan at the end of the
period. Thus, assuming that these funds can be obtained at the gross risk-free nominal
interest rate, ¯rms' total labor costs are now given by RtWtLt.
Since we specify that policy is conducted via an interest rate rule, we do not need to
concern ourselves with market clearing in the loan market. This would only serve to pin
down the value of broad money. Instead, we simply append the portfolio allocation decision
to determine the household's cash balances (which now a®ect welfare), and we incorporate
the e®ects of working capital on ¯rms' labor demand and marginal costs. We then re-estimate
the model, using data on cash balances in addition to the seven variables noted above.52 The
mode estimate of the preference parameter · is 11.4, while the mode estimates of all other
model parameters are nearly the same as in the baseline speci¯cation.53
The modi¯ed model has two key implications for policy. First, owing to the e®ects of
nominal interest rates on costs and money balances, the optimal in°ation rate is no longer
zero, but instead slightly below zero. Second, there is a cost to highly variable nominal in-
terest rates that is absent in the baseline model and a resultant bene¯t to smoothing interest
rates. As a result, the optimal wage in°ation policy rule responds less aggressively to wage
in°ation, with a coe±cient of 1.5, compared to 3.2 in the baseline model.54 The benchmark
wage in°ation rule yields a welfare loss 0.07 percentage points in terms of permanent con-
sumption greater than a rule optimized for this alternative model with monetary frictions
and working capital.
52The money data are available only from 1959 onward, so we shorten the sample by four years. Linearized
expressions are again given in the appendix.
53Complete estimation results are reported in Appendix C.
54It is still the case that the optimal coe±cient on price in°ation is zero.
387.2 Alternative Models of Wage Setting
A key result in our analysis is the importance of stabilizing wages owing to the distortions
associated with wage dispersion under Calvo-style contracts. Given the central role of this
channel, we consider alternative speci¯cations of wage setting that have signi¯cant e®ects
on the welfare implications of sticky wages and on optimal policy. In particular, we consider
two alternative speci¯cations in which the e®ects of wage dispersion on welfare are muted
relative to the Calvo-style model.55
We ¯rst consider a modest modi¯cation to the indexation of wages in the model and
assume that non-optimized wages are indexed to last period's wage in°ation rate, as opposed
to the rate of price in°ation. This modi¯cation reduces the e®ects of °uctuations in wage
in°ation on wage dispersion and thereby on welfare.56 Table 4 reports the results from this
speci¯cation for four speci¯cations of monetary policy. Not surprisingly, the consumption-
equivalent loss in conditional welfare under the optimal policy is somewhat smaller than in
the baseline model.
The relative performance of the benchmark wage in°ation rule, however, is considerably
worse under this form of wage indexation and is dominated by the rule that responds only to
price in°ation. Under the benchmark wage in°ation policy rule, the consumption-equivalent
loss in conditional welfare is 0.6 percentage points larger than under the optimal policy and
0.3 percentage points higher than under the benchmark price in°ation rule. In fact, with this
speci¯cation of wage indexation, the benchmark wage in°ation policy rule does slightlyworse
than the estimated policy rule. Evidently, the result that a simple policy rule designed to
maximize welfare should respond exclusively to wage in°ation is not robust to changes in
55Although not considered here, another model of wage and price setting that does not yield dispersion
e®ects on aggregate welfare is the quadratic adjustment costs model of Rotemberg (1982).
56We estimated a version of the baseline model where wage indexation depends on a combination of past
price and wage in°ation. We found that the weight is primarily on past price in°ation, providing support
for the baseline model speci¯cation. Nonetheless, one may not be convinced by this ¯nding and remained
concerned about uncertainty regarding the form of wage indexation.
39Table 5: Welfare under Uncertainty Regarding Wage Setting
Optimal Empirical Benchmark Wage Benchmark Price
Experiment Policy Reaction In°ation Rule In°ation Rule
Baseline speci¯cation -2.01 -2.57 -2.13 -2.60
Wage-wage indexation -1.85 -2.34 -2.46 -2.15
Taylor contracts -0.35 -0.41 -0.85 -0.50
the model of wage determination, even to this seemingly innocuous change in the model
speci¯cation.
We now consider a more substantive change in the speci¯cation of wage and price deter-
mination, and assume that contracts have ¯xed duration as in Taylor (1980); see also Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000).57 Compared with the baseline speci¯cation of Calvo-style
contracts with random duration, this alternative speci¯cation limits the degree of price and
wage dispersion{and the associated welfare costs{resulting from the presence of some prices
and wages that have not been reoptimized for many periods.
We suppose that nominal wages and prices are determined by staggered contracts that
are reset every M periods. Thus at t the distribution of wages is given by fWt;jg where
j = 1;:::;M denotes the number of periods since the last re-set. In particular, we assume
that all price and wage contracts last for four quarters, implying mean contract durations
somewhat shorter than implied by our posterior mean estimates of the Calvo update param-
eters, »p and »w. We do not change any other parameter estimates and revert to the baseline
assumption that wages are indexed to past price in°ation. The results are reported in Ta-
ble 5. As expected, replacing Calvo-style wage and price setting with Taylor-style contracts
signi¯cantly reduces wage and price dispersion and hence the welfare costs associated with
°uctuations.
57As explained below, we have not formally estimated this alternative speci¯cation. The empirical perfor-
mance of the model may be sensitive to which type of nominal rigidity is assumed; see Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan (2000), Kiley (2002), and Guerrieri (2001).
40With Taylor-style staggered wages and prices, the relative performance of the benchmark
wage in°ation rule falls dramatically, while the estimated policy rule is nearly optimal.
The benchmark price in°ation rule outperforms the benchmark wage in°ation rule, but
falls behind the estimated rule. With Taylor price and wage contracts, the welfare costs
associated with price and wage dispersion are relatively modest and, therefore, the optimal
policy focuses on coming close to the real allocation in the °exible wage and price economy.
The estimated rule accomplishes this balance very well, while the benchmark price in°ation
rule is somewhat less e®ective owing to a lack of response to the output gap. The performance
of the benchmark wage in°ation rule su®ers more signi¯cantly because it implicitly puts far
too much emphasis on stabilizing nominal wage in°ation relative to achieving the °exible
wage and price real allocation.58
Finally, it should be noted that the welfare cost of business cycles and the performance of
alternative monetary policies are sensitive not only to the structure of nominal contracts but
to the speci¯cation of household preferences. For example, as in CEE and SW, our analysis
has followed Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) in assuming that each individual household
provides a distinct labor service, whereas Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (this volume) assume
that each household has a continuum of members providing all types of labor services and
that the household's utility only depends on its total hours of work. While such assumptions
might seem to be merely technical details, in fact these di®erences have fairly dramatic
consequences for the ¯rst-order dynamics of wage in°ation, the second-order e®ects of cross-
sectional wage dispersion, and the design of welfare-maximizing policy rules.59
58We also examined a version of the model with Taylor wage contracts and Calvo prices. The results were
very similar to those found when both wages and prices are set by Taylor contracts.
59The speci¯cation of Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) implies a much °atter nominal wage Phillips
curve; that is, nominal wage in°ation is much less sensitive to the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure. Furthermore, cross-sectional wage dispersion induces di®erences in labor across
households that have substantial e®ects on social welfare.
418 Conclusion
Over the past decade there has been remarkable progress in developing empirical micro-
founded macroeconomic models for monetary policy analysis. In this paper we have drawn
on and extended this literature to consider the design of policy under uncertainty. By
confronting a fully-speci¯ed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with the data,
we can directly gauge the uncertainty associated with the model parameters as well as the
implications of alternative assumptions about the model speci¯cation.
Our analysis indicates that the welfare cost of business cycles is quite large{an order
of magnitude larger than the ¯ndings emphasized by Lucas (2003){and arises mainly due
to ine±ciencies associated with cross-sectional dispersion in wages and employment. As a
direct consequence, we ¯nd that the welfare outcome associated with optimal policy under
commitment is closely matched by a very simple rule that responds solely to nominal wage
in°ation. Furthermore, the performance of this benchmark wage in°ation rule is remarkably
robust to uncertainty about the structural parameters and the particular shocks hitting the
economy. The performance of this rule is very sensitive to the speci¯cation of wage and price
determination, suggesting that a hybrid rule involving both wage and price in°ation might
be more robust across a broader class of models.
These ¯ndings underscore the central importance of labor markets for analyzing the
welfare costs of macroeconomic °uctuations and the design of monetary policy. Of course,
the crucial role of wage setting and employment dynamics has long been recognized, and
recent research has refocused interest on these issues; see Hall (2005). Thus, further progress
in formulating micro-founded speci¯cations of labor market behavior and comparing the
empirical performance of these speci¯cations is likely to have substantial payo®s for the
design of monetary policy.
Finally, while our analysis has emphasized the implications of policymaker uncertainty
42regarding the true structure of the economy, we have abstracted completely from the role
of learning by policymakers or private agents. Nevertheless, we recognize that the learning
mechanism is crucial for understanding the evolution of the economy in response to changes
in the monetary policy regime{such as the Volcker disin°ation{and to other aggregate dis-
turbances.60 Thus, incorporating learning in micro-founded macroeconometric models and
reconsidering the policy implications represents a natural direction for future research.61
60Erceg and Levin (2003) analyze a DGE model roughly similar to the one in this paper and show that
private agents' gradual learning about the Fed's in°ation objective is crucial for interpreting the e®ects of
the Volcker disin°ation, while Edge, Laubach, and J. Williams (2003) and Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2005)
highlight the role of learning in ¯tting the stylized facts of the U.S. productivity growth boom of the late
1990s.
61See Beck and Wieland (2002) for analysis of optimal learning and control in a small stylized economy
with ongoing structural change.
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50Appendix
A The Nonlinear Model
A.1 The Baseline Model
The text describes the household side, and we now ¯ll in some detail on the ¯rm side. De¯ne






where Ã is the inverse of the elasticity of utilization cost with respect to utilization, and ¹ is
chosen so that steady state utilization costs are zero. Also de¯ne the investment adjustment
cost function from (4) by:
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Note that adjustment costs are assumed to be zero at the steady state, S(1) = 0, and are
only of second-order at the steady state.












where Lt(i;j) is the input of labor of type j at plant i. The plant's output is given by (3).
Aggregate ¯nal good output, Yt is created by (costlessly) combining a continuum of












Final goods output is equal to consumption, aggregate investment, It, government spending,
Gt, and capital utilization costs:
Yt = Ct + Gt + It + ª(Ut)Kt¡1: (8)
A.2 Equilibrium Allocation and Prices
In the following, we omit household and plant indices where no confusion will result. The
household's budget constraint is standard and households trade in a complete market to
allocate their consumption over time. Let MUCt denote the marginal utility associated with
51an incremental increase in consumption in period t, accounting for its e®ect on period utility
in the period t + 1:
MUCt = Z
b
t (Ct ¡ µCt¡1)
¡¾ ¡ ¯µEtZ
b
t+1 (Ct+1 ¡ µCt)
¡¾ : (9)
The consumption Euler equation summarizes the representative household's optimal saving
behavior:
MUCt = Et [MUCt+1RtPt=Pt+1]; (10)
where Rt is the gross nominal interest rate and Pt is the price level.
Households set wages subject to their individual labor demand curves, which arise from











































As in usual in Calvo pricing models, (12) incorporates forward-looking expectations of future
nominal wages, but now includes lagged in°ation via the partial indexation.
Households own the capital stock, Kt, which they accumulate using the capital accumu-
lation technology and rent to ¯rms at rental rate Rk
t. This leads to three key relationships.
First, we let Qt be the real share value per unit of capital, which is determined by an asset
















t is the i.i.d. external ¯nance premium shock. The optimal investment decision leads





























This equation balances the costs and bene¯ts of investment, with lagged investment and the
shocks showing up through the e®ects of the costs of adjustment. Finally, the ¯rst order














Thus, ¯rms equate the marginal rate of transformation between labor and e®ective capital
(UtKt¡1) to the relative factor prices, and the capital-labor ratio is identical across ¯rms.

























































Finally, we close the model by specifying an empirical monetary policy reaction function.
We specify policy in terms of a generalized Taylor-type rule, where the policy authority
sets nominal rates in response to in°ation and the output gap. To do this, we de¯ne a
model-consistent output gap as the di®erence between actual and potential output, where
potential output is de¯ned as what would prevail under °exible prices and wages and in





t) that cause variations in wage and
price markups and the external ¯nance premium. Thus the model is supplemented with
°exible-price versions of the key equations (10)-(18) which determine potential output Y ¤
t .
Then the policy rule is assumed to take the following form:
rt = rirt¡1 + (1 ¡ ri)
³
¹ ¼t + r¼(¼t¡1 ¡ ¼
¤
















Here rt = logRt is the short-term interest rate, ¼t = ¢ln(Pt=Pt¡1) is the in°ation rate, ¼¤
t
is an AR(1) shock to the in°ation objective, and ´R
t is an i.i.d. policy shock.
53A.3 The Model with Monetary Frictions
In the model with monetary frictions from Section 7.1, the household also has a portfolio






¡· = (Rt ¡ 1)MUCt: (21)
















Market clearing in the loan market then implies:
WtLt = At ¡ Mt;
where At represents the level of broad money after the infusion of money via the central
bank.
A.4 The Model with Staggered Contracts
In the model with staggered contracts from Section 7.2, we must make a few alterations to the
model. We again allow for partial indexation, so the evolution of an individual household's






Wt¡1;j¡1 if j 6= M
= ~ wt if j = M:


































54B The Linearized Model
B.1 Baseline Model
For much of the paper we work with the log-linearized version of the model described above,
which we present here. We use lower-case letters to indicate the logarithmic deviations from
steady state. In the case of shocks, ²x
t and ´x
t refer to the shocks normalized to the log-linear
equations, with the ² shocks being persistent and the ´ shocks i.i.d.
To save on notation, we de¯ne ¹ Rk as the mean real rate of return on capital which
is assumed to satisfy ¯ = 1=(1 ¡ ± + ¹ Rk), and Á equals 1 plus the share of ¯xed costs in
production. Furthermore, we denote cy, gy, and ky as the steady-state ratios of consumption,
government spending, and capital to output, respectively.
The following ten equations in ten endogenous variables fct;it;qt;kt;rk
t ;ut;lt;yt;wt;¼tg
are the linearized counterparts to the equations described in Section A of this appendix:
ct = Et
1
1 + µ + ¯µ2
n
µct¡1 + (1 + ¯µ





(1 ¡ ¯µ)(rt ¡ ¼t+1) ¡ ²
b







qt = ¡(rt ¡ Et¼t+1) +
1
1 ¡ ± + ¹ Rk
n
























lt = ¡wt + r
k
t + ut + kt¡1; (31)
yt = cyct + gy²
g














¯wt+1 + wt¡1 + ¯¼t+1 ¡ (1 + ¯°w)¼t + °w¼t¡1 (34)
¡
¸w(1 ¡ ¯»w)(1 ¡ »w)
(¸w + (1 + ¸w)Â)»w
³














(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¯µ)
((1 + ¯µ







¯Et¼t+1 + °p¼t¡1 +











As shown in Onatski and N. Williams (2004), equation (32) corrects a slight error in SW
due to the capital utilization costs, which enter as the ¯nal term.

















t is a mean zero innovation with variance ¾2







t g, are assumed to be i.i.d. with mean zero and variance ¾2
x. The innovations
are assumed to have zero contemporaneous correlation.
The full model also includes counterparts to equations (26)-(33) that describe the log-
linearized equations for the °exible-price allocation. In these equations, the shocks ´p, ´q,
and ´w are set to zero, as is the in°ation rate. The nominal interest rate is replaced by the
°exible-price real interest rate, r¤










tg, where the asterisk superscript denotes the °exible-price value
of the variable.
We close the model by including the linearized counterpart to the policy rule:
rt = rirt¡1 + (1 ¡ ri)
¡
¹ ¼t + r¼(¼t¡1 ¡ ¼
¤





+r¢¼(¼t ¡ ¼t¡1) + r¢y(yt ¡ y
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B.2 Model with Monetary Frictions
Here we note the modi¯cations to the expressions above when we consider the model with





¹ R ¡ 1
rt+
¾











where mt is the log-deviation of real cash balances. Here ¹ R is the steady-state gross nominal
rate which satis¯es ¹ R = 1 + ¹ Rk ¡ ±. Linearizing (22) we see that we replace (31) with:
lt = ¡wt ¡ rt + r
k
t + zt + kt¡1 (39)





¯Et¼t+1 + °p¼t¡1 +











56C Estimation Details and Results
C.1 Speci¯cation of the Priors
Table 6 reports the details of the speci¯cation of the prior for the model.62 For the parameters
of the shock processes, where we had little guidance from the literature, we set relatively loose
priors. For the standard deviations, we used gamma distributions with standard deviations
equal to the means. We gauged the relative magnitudes of the shocks from Onatski and
N. Williams (2004) and SW. For all but one persistence parameter, we used a wide beta
distribution. The exception was the in°ation objective shock. Since it and the interest
rate shock enter additively in the policy rule (37), a tighter prior is necessary to distinguish
between them. For the structural parameters, we chose the parameters of the distributions
to cover the range of estimates we found in the literature with reasonably high probability.
C.2 Computation of the Posterior
As in SW, we ¯rst look for a parameter vector which maximizes the posterior mode, given our
prior and the likelihood based on the data. We took great e®orts to explore the parameter
space su±ciently to locate a global maximum. In particular, we sampled 200 values from the
prior distribution, and used these as starting values for Chris Sims's optimization algorithms
designed to avoid common problems with likelihood functions (available on his web page).
We re-ran it in combination with a standard hill-climber algorithm until it settled on the
maximal value. We used the resulting mode as the starting point for our MCMC sampling.
We then sample from the posterior distribution using a Metropolis-Hastings Markov
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm in order to make small sample inferences about
the parameters. We sampled 10 separate chains for 45,000 periods each, discarding the
¯rst 15,000 periods. Thus we were left with 300,000 points from the posterior distribution.
In order to assess convergence of the Markov chains, we use the potential scale reduction
statistic described by Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2004) which gave clear indications
of convergence for all the parameters.
C.3 Estimation Results for the Shocks and the Monetary Model
The text reports the estimation results for the structural parameters. Table 7 reports the
estimates of the parameters for the shock processes. Figure 8 plots the prior and posterior
distributions for the parameters describing the shock processes. Our prior insures that ¾r
never hits zero, but its modal value is only 4 £ 10¡6. Except for the investment shock, the
AR(1) shocks are highly persistent, with the in°ation objective shock in particular being
nearly a unit root process.
62For a brief survey of the literature on speci¯cation of priors, see Onatski and N. Williams (2004). This
survey includes studies focusing on real models (such as King and Rebelo (1999) and Boldrin, Christiano,
and Fisher (2001)) as well as papers focusing on monetary policy in smaller models (such as Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997), Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Sack (1998)).
57Table 6: Speci¯cation of Priors
Parameter Distribution Mean Std Dev
³ Investment adjustment costs Normal 0.5 0.2
¾ Consumption utility Normal 2 0.5
µ Consumption habit Beta 0.7 0.15
Â Labor utility Normal 1.2 0.5
Á ¡ 1 Fixed cost-1 Gamma 0.075 0.0125
Ã¡1 Capital utilization costs Log Normal 6.4 5
»w Calvo wages Beta 0.375 0.1
»p Calvo prices Beta 0.375 0.1
°w Wage indexation Beta 0.5 0.25
°p Price indexation Beta 0.5 0.25
r¼ Policy, lagged in°ation Normal 2 0.5
r¢¼ Policy, change in ¼ Normal 0.2 0.1
ri Policy, lagged interest rate Normal 1 0.15
ry Policy, lagged output gap Gamma 0.25 0.25
r¢y Policy, change in gap Gamma 0.25 0.25
¾a Productivity Gamma 0.6 0.6
¾¼ In°ation objective Gamma 0.1 0.1
¾b Preference Gamma 0.3 0.3
¾g Govt. spending Gamma 0.3 0.3
¾l Labor supply Gamma 3 3
¾i Investment Gamma 0.1 0.1
¾r Interest rate Gamma 0.1 0.1
¾q External ¯nance premium Gamma 5 5
¾p Price markup Gamma 0.2 0.2
¾w Wage markup Gamma 0.2 0.2
½a Productivity Beta 0.5 0.25
½¼ In°ation objective Beta 0.85 0.1
½b Preference Beta 0.5 0.25
½g Government spending Beta 0.5 0.25
½l Labor supply Beta 0.5 0.25
½i Investment Beta 0.5 0.25
58Table 7: Estimation Results
Posterior 90% Probability
Parameter Mean Interval
¾a Productivity 0.5949 0.5441 { 0.6490
¾¼ In°ation objective 0.1153 0.0916 { 0.1430
¾b Preference 0.1346 0.0739 { 0.2171
¾g Govt. spending 0.2873 0.2635 { 0.3134
¾l Labor supply 2.4625 1.8121 { 3.2219
¾i Investment 1.0625 0.8815 { 1.2570
¾r Interest rate 0.0001 0.0000 { 0.0000
¾q External ¯nance premium 4.0198 2.5531 { 6.4477
¾p Price markup 0.2072 0.1812 { 0.2363
¾w Wage markup 0.3035 0.2743 { 0.3351
½a Productivity 0.9639 0.9467 { 0.9794
½¼ In°ation objective 0.9950 0.9871 { 0.9995
½b Preference 0.9397 0.8868 { 0.9835
½g Govt. spending 0.9443 0.9147 { 0.9710
½l Labor supply 0.9833 0.9652 { 0.9972
½i Investment 0.7170 0.5755 { 0.8356
r¼ Policy, lagged in°ation 2.6951 2.1525 { 3.2813
r¢¼ Policy, change in ¼ 0.2637 0.1650 { 0.3612
ri Policy, lagged interest rate 0.8392 0.7817 { 0.8921
ry Policy, lagged output gap 0.0968 0.0086 { 0.2417
r¢y Policy, change in gap 0.5091 0.4077 { 0.6386
Table 8 reports the estimates for the speci¯cation of the model with monetary frictions
from Section 7.1.
D Optimal Policy
Here we report the impulse responses to other shocks.
In response to positive shocks to wages and Tobin's Q, the optimal policy calls for a
sharp increase in interest rates that causes a large decline in consumption. The contrac-
tionary policy response reduces the responses of wages. In contrast, the estimated policy
rule accommodates the shocks to a greater degree and allows larger rises in wage in°ation.
The optimal policy response to a transitory shock to prices, however, is to do virtually noth-
ing. The estimated policy rule reacts to the rise in in°ation, sending real rates higher and






























































































Figure 8: Estimated posterior distributions (red solid lines) and prior distributions (blue dashed) for the
parameters describing the shock processes.
60Baseline Money
Parameter Speci¯cation Frictions
³ Investment adjustment 0.5487 0.6119
¾ Consumption Utility 2.0445 2.0433
µ Consumption Habit 0.2935 0.3219
Â Labor Utility 1.4051 1.6037
· Money Utility { 11.3822
Á Fixed cost 1.0824 1.0805
Ã Capital utilization 0.1981 0.1769
»w Calvo wages 0.8074 0.8123
»p Calvo prices 0.8240 0.8335
°w Wage indexation 0.7734 0.8670
°p Price indexation 0.1159 0.1957
¾a Productivity 0.5942 0.5791
¾¼ In°ation objective 0.1067 0.1030
¾b Preference 0.1205 0.1256
¾g Govt. spending 0.2847 0.2878
¾l Labor supply 2.3217 2.3597
¾i Investment 1.0349 1.0770
¾r Interest rate 0.0000 0.0000
¾q External ¯nance premium 3.6781 3.3857
¾p Price markup 0.2048 0.1653
¾w Wage markup 0.2987 0.2931
¾m Money demand { 19.8955
½a Productivity 0.9611 0.9562
½¼ In°ation objective 0.9944 0.9993
½b Preference 0.9443 0.9392
½g Govt. spending 0.9418 0.9486
½l Labor supply 0.9803 0.9853
½i Investment 0.7309 0.7221
½m Money demand { 0.9877
r¼ Policy, lagged in°ation 2.7323 2.7974
r¢¼ Policy, change in ¼ 0.2847 0.2586
ri Policy, lagged interest rate 0.8318 0.8412
ry Policy, lagged output gap 0.0001 0.0001
r¢y Policy, change in gap 0.4811 0.5063




























































































































































Figure 9: Impulse responses for one standard deviation shocks; optimal policy (red solid lines), estimated



































































































































Figure 10: Impulse responses for one standard deviation shocks; optimal policy (red solid lines), estimated





























































































































































Figure 11: Impulse responses for one standard deviation shocks; optimal policy (red solid lines), optimized



































































































































Figure 12: Impulse responses for one standard deviation shocks; optimal policy (red solid lines), optimized
wage in°ation policy rule (blue dashed lines), and the optimized price in°ation rule (dash-dot magenta lines).
65